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Congestion phenomena caused by matching pennies in evolutionary games
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Evolutionary social dilemma games are extended by an additional matching-pennies game that modifies the
collected payoffs. In a spatial version players are distributed on a square lattice and interact with their neigh-
bors. Firstly, we show that the matching-pennies game can be considered as the microscopic force of the Red
Queen effect that breaks the detailed balance and induces eddies in the microscopic probability currents if the
strategy update is analogous to the Glauber dynamics for the kinetic Ising models. The resulting loops in prob-
ability current breaks symmetry between the chessboard-like arrangements of strategies via a bottleneck effect
occurring along the four-edge loops in the microscopic states. The impact of this congestion is analogous to
the application of a staggered magnetic field in the Ising model, that is, the order-disorder critical transition is
wiped out by noise. It is illustrated that the congestion induced symmetry breaking can be beneficial for the
whole community within a certain region of parameters.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb, 87.23.-n, 05.70.Ln
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent evolutionary games on networks [1–4] are fre-
quently used approach to study evolutionary processes charac-
teristic to biological and social systems. In these models play-
ers are located on the sites of a network (or lattice) and their
strategies represent biological entities or individual choices.
For most of the cases the pair interactions among players are
characterized by two-player games [5].
In these evolutionary games a uniform, symmetric, two-
player, two-strategy game defines the payoffs for both players
[6]. In that simple cases we can distinguish only four possible
strategy pairs (henceforth strategy profiles) for the elementary
interactions. In Fig. 1 these strategy profiles are illustrated by
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FIG. 1: Flow diagrams for two-payer two-strategy games. The left
and right diagrams show the payoffs for the prisoner’s dilemmas
(S < 0 and T > 1) and matching-pennies game. Arrows along
the edges point towards the preferred strategy profile from the view
point of player who modifies unilaterally her strategy.
large boxes with white and black bullets representing the two
possible strategies for each player. The actual payoffs are de-
noted within these bullets. For the prisoner’s dilemma, as the
most challenging social dilemmas, the black and white bullets
refer to Defection (D) and Cooperation (C) strategies while
for the matching-pennies game these symbols denote Head
and Tail (two sides of a coin) states. Henceforth we use the
abbreviated nomination of C and D strategies and the tradi-
tional notation of payoffs introduced for the investigation of
social dilemmas [7, 8].
The mentioned games represent two significantly different
behaviors as it is illustrated in the flow diagrams where the
edges connect those strategy profiles that can be transformed
into each other by a single strategy change of a player. For the
symmetric two-player, two-strategy games the payoff varia-
tions of the active player from both the DD and CC strategy
profiles are equivalent. In fact, this is the reason why the sum
of the payoff variations of active players along the single loop
is zero independently of the values of S and T . Consequently,
all the symmetric two-player two-strategy games are potential
games [9–11]. For the potential games one can find a poten-
tial (as a function of strategy profile) summarizing the driving
force for the unilateral strategy changes on the analogy of the
potential energy in physical systems. For the multi-strategy
systems potential can exist if the above condition is satisfied
along all the possible loops in the space of strategy profiles.
The existence of potential is accompanied with some general
features. Namely, the maximal value of potential is achieved
at a pure Nash equilibrium; additional pure Nash equilibria
are represented by nodes without outgoing edges; and the ab-
sence of directed loops are forbidden in the flow diagram. For
the potential games the latter feature results in that one can
arrive to one of the pure Nash equilibria when following the
direction of arrows from any initial state for the multi-strategy
and/or multi-agent games [12, 13].
If a multi-agent system is built up from two-player potential
games then the potential for the whole system will be the sum
of the pair potentials. Blume [14, 15] has shown that the evo-
2lutionary potential games evolve into a Gibbs ensemble if the
evolution is controlled by a logit rule [16] that is similar to the
Glauber [17] or Metropolis [18] dynamics introduced for the
investigation of kinetic Ising models. In other words, all these
multi-agent systems with symmetric two-strategy interactions
are equivalent to an Ising model [6, 19–21].
On the contrary, the flow diagram of matching-pennies
game represents a fundamentally different interaction. In that
case the players are not equivalent and one of the players is
always motivated to change her strategy. As a result, there is
a uniform payoff increase (driving force) along the four edges
that represents a directed loop in the flow diagram. For this
game potential does not exist and the single Nash equilibrium
is a mixed strategy profile where both players choose their
strategy at random [22, 23]. The matching-pennies game can
be interpreted as a driving force creating circular transitions in
the flow diagram and probability current loops in the dynam-
ical graphs that can be quantified by evaluating the entropy
production [21, 24]. The relevance of a conceptually similar
circular transitions in biological systems was first described
by van Valen [25, 26] who named this effect as Red Queen
mechanism. Similar endless races can be observed in social
systems between buyers and sellers [27], property owners and
criminals [28], males and females [29, 30], or conformists and
rebels [31]. The consideration of an evolutionary multi-agent
system on network with this type of interactions prescribes
two kinds of players distributed on bipartite graphs or lattices
[32].
The evolutionary matching-pennies game and its combina-
tion with an anti-coordination game were considered previ-
ously for several structured populations [21]. In the present
paper we extend these analysis to systems where the men-
tioned probability current loops are distorted by bottleneck
effects which can modify the macroscopic behavior signifi-
cantly.
II. THE MODEL
Now we study spatial evolutionary games with players lo-
cated on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions.
Each player has two strategies and collects income with play-
ing games with the four nearest neighbors. The pair interac-
tion will be composed of a symmetric two-player two-strategy
game (a social dilemma with T − S parametrization) and
a matching-pennies game. Our analysis will focus onto the
region of hawk-dove games (T > 1 and S > 0) where
chessboard-like strategy arrangements occur for myopic or
Glauber type strategy updates preferred in statistical physics
[21, 33, 34].
Both the suitable description of the chessboard-like strat-
egy arrangements and the application of the matchingpennies
game require the division of the square lattice into two equiv-
alent sublattices denoted as α = X or Y resembling the black
and white squares on a chessboard. For this sublattice division
each site x (x ∈ X) is surrounded by four nearest neighbors
belonging to the opposite sublattice (x + δ ∈ Y ) and vice
versa. It is convenient to denote the strategies of players at
sites x and y by unite vectors as
sx, sy = D =
(
1
0
)
, or C =
(
0
1
)
. (1)
Using this traditional notation the player’s income can be
given by a sum of matrix products
ux =
∑
δ
sx ·Asx+δ , uy =
∑
δ
sy ·Bsy+δ , (2)
where the summation runs over the four nearest neighbor sites
belonging to the opposite sublattice. According to the model
definition the pair interactions of nearest neighbors are the
composition of a social dilemma and a cyclic game. The cor-
responding payoff matrix is given as:
A =
(
ε T − ε
S − ε 1 + ε
)
, B =
(
−ε T + ε
S + ε 1− ε
)
, (3)
where ε quantifies the strength of matching-pennies compo-
nent.
During the elementary step of the evolutionary process a
player is chosen randomly and she modifies her strategy from
sx to s′x with a probability depending on the payoff difference
(u′x − ux) between the final and initial states. Namely, the
strategy update probability is given as
W (sx → s
′
x, s−x) =
1
1 + exp[(ux − u′x)/K]
, (4)
where the strategy profile for the rest of players, denoted tra-
ditionally as s−x, remains unchanged.
This transition favors the state providing higher payoff for
the player x and similar rule is applied for the players of the
opposite sublattice. Notice that W (sx → s′x, s−x) ≃ 1 (or 0)
if ux ≪ u′x (or ux ≫ u′x) while the ”width” of the transient
region is proportional to K that measures the magnitude of
noise or the strength of selection. Noteworthy that the prob-
ability of strategy change [given by Eq. (4)] is equivalent to
those suggested by Glauber [17] for the kinetic Ising model.
For ε = 0 the above system satisfies the condition of poten-
tial games [9] because the sum of payoff variation along the
single loop is zero, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In fact the kinetic
Ising model and the corresponding two-strategy evolutionary
potential games are equivalent, thus the coupling constant (J)
between the neighboring spins (sx = ±1) and the strength (h)
of the external magnetic field can be expressed by the payoff
parameters as J = (1−S−T )/4 and h = 1+S−T while K
corresponds to the temperature in the thermodynamical sys-
tem [6, 11, 19, 20]. The effect of ε on the transition from the
anti-ferromagnetic to the paramagnetic phase as a function of
K is investigated in a recent paper for the absence of external
field h [21]. It is found that the disturbance of the matching-
pennies component reduces the critical value of K while the
universal (Ising type) features of the critical transition are pre-
served.
In the present work we explore how the stationary states
of an evolutionary social dilemmas are influenced by the
matching-pennies game in the presence of an external field
3(h 6= 0) representing games with S 6= T − 1. In the litera-
ture of Ising models [35] it is well described that at zero tem-
perature the ordered anti-ferromagnetic state is transformed
into the preferred ferromagnetic state if h exceeds a threshold
value proportional to J (the pre-factor depends on the num-
ber neighbors determined by the lattice structure). On the
other hand, by increasing temperature K the system exhibits
an Ising type critical phase transition from the ordered anti-
ferromagnetic state to the disordered spin arrangement at a
critical point (Kc) decreasing with |h| [36–38]. Now it will
be shown that the latter robust critical transition is smoothed
out for |ε| > 0. For this purpose we first study a two-player
game exhibiting the congestion phenomenon that results in
macroscopic changes in the multi-player systems.
III. CONGESTION FOR TWO-PLAYER SYSTEM
In this section we study a two player game with the same
dynamical rule introduced in the previous section. In that case
the system has only four microscopic states [s = (D,D),
(D,C), (C,D), or (C,C)] and the corresponding probabili-
ties p(s) in the stationary state can be determined numerically
by solving the suitable equations of motion for any values of
payoff parameters and noise levels. In the absence of neigh-
borhood, we can apply a simplified version of the traditional
pair approximation (for a brief survey see [6, 39]). Figure
2 compares the configuration probabilities in dependence of ε
for the all the four possible strategy pairs at a fixed noise level.
The dashed lines in the left panel of Fig. 2 represent the be-
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FIG. 2: Probabilities of strategy pairs as a function of ε for T = 1.5,
S = 0.5 (left panel, dashed lines) and T = 1.4, S = 0.3 (right
panel, solid lines) at K = 0.3.
havior when the (D,D) and (C,C) strategy pairs appear with
the same probability for arbitrary values of ε. This is equiva-
lent to h = 0 case for the terminology of Ising model. Here
p(D,C) = p(C,D) for any values of ε and all the four con-
figuration probabilities tend to 1/4 if the matching-pennies
components dominate the game, as it is discussed in [21].
The latter behavior reflects the fact that the matching-pennies
game has only one mixed Nash equilibrium when both players
choose their strategies at random. Notice furthermore that the
variations in the configuration probabilities are even functions
of ε.
Significantly different behavior can be observed if 1 + S −
T = h 6= 0 even for ε = 0. The right plot of Fig. 2 shows
a situation when the preferred (C,D) and (D,C) strategies
are present with the same high probability while p(D,D) >
p(C,C) that is obtained for the payoff parameters given in
the caption of Fig. 2. It is emphasized that in the absence
of matching-pennies component the system satisfies the con-
dition of detailed balance, that is, the forward and backward
transitions appear with the same probabilities along the four
edges of the flow diagram as it is illustrated in the left plot of
Fig. 3.
ε=0 ε=0.1
FIG. 3: Configuration probabilities are illustrated by the height
of columns for the absence (left plot) and presence (right plot) of
matching-pennies component for T = 1.4 and S = 0.3. In the
right plot the directed ellipse illustrates the emergence of a proba-
bility current loop that modifies the configuration probabilities via a
bottleneck effect and the white arrows on the faces of columns show
how the probabilities change due to the congestion phenomenon.
The presence of the matching-pennies component, how-
ever, breaks the detailed balance and induces a probability
current through the four-edge loop with a strength character-
ized by the difference of transition frequencies between the
forward and backward directions along the four edges. In
the steady state these probability currents should be equiv-
alent due to Kirchhoff laws [40]. This uniform probability
current modifies the configuration probabilities p(s) and de-
stroys the equivalence between (D,C) and (C,D) configura-
tions because the (D,D) and (C,C) states represent different
barriers (widths of bottleneck) for the probability current flow.
As a result, p(D,C) [p(C,D)] increases [decreases] linearly
with with the strength of the matching-pennies component for
small values of ε. The white arrows in Fig. 3 show that at the
bottleneck states the corresponding probabilities increase as it
happens before the narrower bottleneck while the probability
of the fourth should be reduced because
∑
s
p(s) = 1.
Notice that the linear dependence on ε implies that the be-
haviors of p(D,C) and p(C,D) are exchanged when revers-
ing the sign of ε, that is accompanied with a reversal of prob-
ability current, too. For high values of ε the system tends
towards a uniform strategy distribution as mentioned above.
Consequently, if ε is increased then p(C,D) exhibits a local
4maximum at ε ≃ 0.1 if T = 1.4, S = 0.3, and K = 0.3. For
the opposite sign of ε the variations of p(D,C) and p(C,D)
are exchanged as shown in Fig. 2. The results of this con-
gestion phenomenon is resembling the impact of a staggered
magnetic field hs (hs is positive for the sites of sublattice X
and negative on the sublattice Y ) for the anti-ferromagnetic
Ising models that prefers one of the ordered arrangements to
the other.
The driving effect of the matching-pennies component
seems to be similar to the effect of external electric field in
driven lattice gas models [41]. For these models the exter-
nal field drives the system out off the Boltzmann distribution
[42] and generates a permanent particle transport when peri-
odic boundary conditions are applied. It breaks inherent sym-
metries [43], enhances the effect of noise and the impact of
local inhomogeneities [44]. In case of repulsive interaction,
where similar checkerboard-like ordered phase is formed in
the half-filled lattice [45, 46], the order-disorder phase transi-
tion is modified due to the particle transport [47]. Lastly we
note that the effect of bottlenecks along a ring was recently
studied by considering the asymmetric exclusion process [48]
that is the simplest version of the driven lattice gases. The
latter investigation is motivated by biological experiments in-
dicating unidirectional circular ribosome translocations along
messenger RNA loops with defects or slow codons in cells
[49].
The application of the matching-pennies component in
evolutionary games induces local probability currents within
many significantly shorter loops that can be quantified even
for two neighboring players when considering the transitions
among the four possible strategy profiles for most of their
quenched neighborhood [21].
IV. CONGESTION FOR MULTI-PLAYER SYSTEM
The above-mentioned weak effect of the matching-pennies
component remains valid for each pair and it is amplified for
the multi-agent games. As a result the macroscopic system
will evolve into the preferred ordered strategy distribution at
sufficiently low noise levels. This fact is illustrated in Fig. 4
where the frequency of strategy C (ρα(C)) is plotted as a
function of noise level K for both sublattices (α = X,Y ).
For ε = 0 this system shows an Ising type critical transition
at Kc = 0.3922(1) from the sublattice ordered strategy ar-
rangement to a disordered state [21]. This critical transition,
however, is smoothed out if the game includes the matching-
pennies component.
Open symbols in Fig. 4 show the Monte Carlo (MC) results
we obtained for ε = 0.1 on square lattice with a linear size
L = 400. In that cases the sampling and relaxation times
are chosen to be ts = tr = 10, 000 MCS where within the
time unit (MCS) each player has a chance once on average to
modify her strategy. When reversing the sign of ε then the
strategy occupations in the sublattices are exchanged. As we
argued, this phenomenon is a straightforward consequence of
the congestion effect we described in the two-player model.
Furthermore, the sublattice occupations tends toward the pre-
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FIG. 4: Frequency of strategy C as a function of K in sublattice X
(open diamonds) and Y (open boxes) for T = 1.4, S = 0.3, and
ε = 0.1. The filled symbols indicate the same quantities for ε = 0.
diction of Ising model if ε → 0 in a way resembling the van-
ishing of the staggered magnetic field. Evidently, we have to
use significantly larger system sizes (L = 2000) and longer
runs (ts = tr = 106 MCS) for obtaining the reference data at
ε = 0 in order to suppress the undesired effects of the diverg-
ing fluctuations and critical slowing down when approaching
the above-mentioned critical point.
Our numerical analysis is repeated in the full payoff param-
eter region, that covers all social dilemma games at fixed val-
ues of ε and noise level (K = 0.3). The MC data are summed
in Fig. 5 where the lines are obtained by varying T − S at
fixed values of T +S. The MC results indicate the absence of
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FIG. 5: (color online) Frequency of strategyC as a function of payoff
parameters T and S in both sublattices for K = 0.3 and ε = 0.1.
Dashed (red and blue) lines illustrate MC data where the sublattices
are equivalent. The solid (purple) and dotted (green) lines show ρC
in the sublattices X and Y .
sublattice ordering, that is ρX(C) = ρY (C), within a large
regions of the prisoner’s dilemma, harmony, and stag hunt
games. The C strategies dominate equally both sublattices
in the zero noise limit if T < 1 and (T − 1− S) < 0 and the
homogeneousD state is stable if S < 0 and (T − 1− S) > 0
5for the zero noise limit (K → 0).
Staying at the same limit only one of the sublattice ordered
structures appears in the hawk-dove game quadrant (T > 1
and S > 0). More precisely, ρX(C) → 1 and ρY (C) → 0
if ε > 0 and (T − 1 − S) < 0 or when ε < 0 and (T −
1 − S) > 0. Evidently, when reversing the sign of ε and
(T − 1 − S) separately then the preference between the two
sublattice ordered structures are exchanged.
The similarity between the impact of staggered magnetic
field in the Ising model and the introduction of a matching-
pennies component in the hawk-dove game can be demon-
strated by monitoring the motion of an interface separating
the two sublattice ordered arrangements. For both cases the
visualization of the evolutionary process shows clearly the ex-
pansion of the preferred sublattice ordered structure via the
motion of separating interface.
It is emphasized that the two-fold degeneracy can be ob-
served only along the line T − 1 − S = h = 0 separating re-
gions where the chessboard and anti-chessboard arrangements
of the D and C strategies occur as it is shown in Fig. 5. Note-
worthy, that Ising type critical transitions can take place only
along this line if the noise level is increased.
When decreasing the values of ε and K then the widths of
the intermediate transition regions shrink, too. Additionally,
one can observe a disordered state at close vicinity of the cen-
tral point (T − 1 = S = 0) of the T − S plane where both
the coupling constant J and the external magnetic field h van-
ish in the equivalent Ising model. Evidently, the absence of
ordering will also characterize the system behavior if ε and/or
K exceed threshold values depending on T and S.
V. EXPLOITATION OF CONGESTION
The systematic analysis of the evolutionary games has high-
lighted the existence of many different mechanisms enhancing
the total income of societies even for the cases of social dilem-
mas (for a survey see [4, 6, 50, 51]). It is already known that
the total income of society can be influenced by the game it-
self (payoffs and strategy set), the connectivity network, the
dynamical rules including the noise level and allowing co-
evolutionary processes in all ingredients of the systems. In the
light of these results the utilization of congestion phenomenon
emerges directly. The relevance of this question is stressed by
recent experiments investigating human behavior in real-life
situations involving the matching-pennies component in the
payoffs [31, 52, 53].
The above results justify that the main impact of matching-
pennies is related to the preference of one of the chessboard-
like strategy arrangements that suppresses the critical transi-
tion related to the existence of two equivalent (optimal) or-
dered strategy arrangements. As a result, the preferred struc-
ture dominates the system behavior if K > Kc within the
region of hawk-dove games. The latter effect can increase the
total income because of the reduction of the length of inter-
faces responsible to the loss in the total payoff. Conceptually
similar congestion induced increase of collective income may
be expected in human societies.
For an illustration of the mentioned phenomenon we com-
pare the average payoffs as a function of noise K for three
different evolutionary rules whereas the payoff parameters (T
and S) are fixed. For the selected payoffs (T = 1.9 and
S = 0.3) the maximum average payoff [2(T +S)] is achieved
if the C and D strategies form a chessboard-like structure
in the zero noise limit. It is emphasized that the matching-
pennies component does not affect the average payoff as it is
a zero-sum game.
Figure 6 illustrates that the presence of matching-pennies
component increases the average payoff for the given payoff
parameters. The most relevant increase occurs in the vicin-
ity of the critical noise level [Kc(T = 1.9, S = 0.3) =
0.590(4)]. The importance of congestion phenomenon be-
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FIG. 6: Comparison of average payoffs versus noise (K) for evo-
lutionary games on square lattice at T = 1.9 and S = 0.3. Open
circles and boxes represent MC data obtained for ε = 0 and 0.1 if
the evolution is controlled by the logit rule defined by Eq. (4). Solid
line illustrates MC results obtained when the evolution is controlled
by collective pairwise strategy update [54].
comes more striking when the average payoff is compared to
results obtained for other types of dynamical rules. Within
the hawk-dove region the imitation-based rules can not be
considered as an adequate reference because the imitation of
the neighboring strategy prevents the formation of the optimal
strategy arrangement [55]. Up to now one of the highest av-
erage payoffs is achieved by the application of the collective
pair-wise strategy update [54] where the stochasticity is intro-
duced via a noise parameterK , too. For the latter rule the fra-
ternal players take into consideration the co-player’s income.
The corresponding MC data of the average payoffs are illus-
trated by the solid line in Fig. 6. Accordingly, there is a region
of K where the introduction of the matching-pennies payoffs
provide the highest average income for the whole population.
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper we have studied two-strategy evolutionary
games on square lattice when matching-pennies games with a
strength ε are added to the payoffs in order to modify the inter-
actions between neighboring players. Here matching-pennies
6game represents the simplest cyclic dominant game for the
description of Red Queen effect in two-strategy games if the
evolutionary process is controlled by the logit rule resembling
the Glauber dynamics in statistical physics. In that case the
matching-pennies component of the pair interactions can be
considered as a microscopic driving force that destroys the de-
tailed balance by inducing probability current loops through-
out the four microscopic states for each pair interactions.
The presence of the matching-pennies component elimi-
nates the equivalence between the players residing in the two
sublattices. Additionally, the equivalence between the two or-
dered (chessboard- and anti-chessboard-like) strategy distri-
butions is also destroyed via a contagion mechanism affect-
ing the configuration probabilities if the disfavored strategy
pairs [e.g. (D,D) and (C,C)] would be present with different
probabilities at ε = 0. The direction of preference varies with
the sign of ε. Note that the presence of both ordered phases
with equal weights is disadvantageous because along the sep-
arating interfaces frustrating players cannot enjoy sufficiently
high payoff. This ambiguity can be resolved by matching-
pennies component in a desired way.
Finally we emphasize that similar cyclic dominance can
be created by the rock-paper-scissors component in three-
strategy evolutionary games for equivalent players as it is re-
ported for the description of many systems (for a survey see
refs. [3, 4, 6, 11]). In the latter cases, however, the matching-
pennies components and their effects can be recognized within
all the 2× 2 sub-games where the interacting players are lim-
ited to use two different strategy pairs. The latter feature un-
derlines the importance of the matching pennies games as it
can be included within the 2 × 2 sub-games for most of the
symmetric n× n (n > 2) matrix games.
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